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International economic sanctions became a regular tool to achieve foreign policy 
objectives regarding target nation. The sanctions literature mostly focuses on question 
whether sanctions succeed their foreign policy goals or not, but not on the damage caused 
to the sanctioned economy.  The following study attempts to fill this gap by presenting a 
theoretical overview of the literature concerning the impact of sanctions on a target 
country’s economy. Several studies consider different consequences of sanctions on a target 
country, such as reduction of investments and international trade. However, this study seeks 
to go forward and explore impact on currency exchange rate, which is more substantial 
macroeconomic measure of economy than investments and international trade. To be more 
precise, the study empirically analyzes the connection between EU and US sanctions and 
the foreign exchange rate of Russia, using its monthly data over the period of time from 
January 2009 to June 2015. 
The findings suggest that implementation of sanctions have a significant negative 
impact on the domestic currency value. Moreover, since Ruble is substantially connected 
with the oil’s price, the paper tests and confirms the hypothesis that sanctions weaken 
domestic currency, thus making it more dependent on the price of the oil.  
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Sanctions became popular instrument of foreign policy over the last decade, 
especially by United States. Nevertheless, the efficiency of sanctions still remains out of 
scope. 
While plenty of studies that evaluated effects of sanctions focus on the efficiency of 
achieving chosen policy goals on a target nation, it was a small number of studies that 
analyzed the impact on a target nation economy. The main and most used type of sanctions 
are economic sanctions. They are supposed to lead to deterioration of an economic situation 
in the target nation, thereby forcing its government to change certain policy or actions. 
Hence, the first thing on which sanction should have an impact is country’s state of 
economy, which includes exchange rate, international trade and international investments. 
This work seeks to study an impact of sanctions on exchange rate as one of the most 
important macro determinants of country’s economy, which is tightly interrelated with 
other economic variables. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides literature review of sanctions 
and their impact on economy. Section 3 investigates literature of exchange rate models and 
its connection with sanctions. Section 4 lays out the empirical model and specifies the data 








2. Economic Impact of Sanctions 
Economic sanctions are the well-known instruments of diplomacy used to decrease 
economic welfare of a target nation, thereby forcing it to follow the interests of 
international communities. 
Sanctions have never been as popular tools of the foreign policy as nowadays. 
Apparently it has led to increase of the scholars’ attention to whether sanctions are effective 
or not (Hufbauer et al. 1990; Elliot 1998; Drezner 1999). Even though, the effectiveness is 
still questionable. It always depends on the particular cases and circumstances. It could be 
reasonable to remember such well-known cases from the last decade as success with the 
issue of apartheid in South Africa or fails with nuclear policies of Iran and North Korea.  
According to the Hufbauer et al. (2009) most sanctions do not reach their goals. 
They appear to be successful only at 34% of cases. It turns out that most successful are 
sanctions that are focused on moderate changes of the target country policy. They are 
successful in 51% of all cases. And most unsuccessful sanctions are those that try to stop 
military intervention. According to the study, only 21% of sanctions’ episodes reached their 
goals. Attempts to change regime or increase level of democracy were successful in 31% of 
cases. 
O’Sullivan (2003) finds that sanctions have bigger chances to be effective if they 
are multilateral, and they are most likely to fail if sanctions implemented unilaterally. 
Drezner (2000), on the other hand, concludes that the chances of success are not 
statistically significant between multilateral and unilateral sanctions. 




Some scientist, such as Hufbauer et al. (1990), Shagabutdinova and Berejikian 
(2007), based on pre-1990 episodes, found that financial sanctions appear to be successful 
more often than trade sanctions. 
Though each case is very particular, there are some unavoidable consequences. For 
example, sanctions can lead to an uncertainty that in the meantime increases the risk taken 
by the domestic and foreign investors. Thus investment attractiveness of a sanctioned 
country is decreasing, that leads to increase of the capital outflow. 
Another quite popular topic related to sanctions is so-called “smart sanctions”, 
which includes financial sanctions, trade restrictions on particular goods, and travel bans on 
key individuals and organizations. The main idea of “smart sanctions” is to harm elite 
supporters of the targeted regime, while mass public would not be negatively affected. 
Thereby, the elite supporters suppose to suffer from the imposed sanctions and put pressure 
upon the targeted government to compromise. According to Drezner (2011), 
comprehensive sanctions are more effective than selective measures, however the 
superiority of “smart sanctions” is that they minimize humanitarian and human rights 
issues. Besides, they do not hamper bilateral trade flows, thereby have minimal cost. 
While most of the scholars were paying attention to the efficiency of sanctions only 
as success or failure of achieving foreign policy goals, there were some attempts to 
breakthrough this tendency. 
Hufbauer et al. (1997) were pioneers in researching economic impact of sanctions. 
They empirically measured the impact of economic sanctions on bilateral trade flows using 
gravity model. They found that economic sanctions have a huge negative impact on 
bilateral trade flows between target and sender nations. At the further study Hufbauer et al. 




(2009) specified that sanctions reduce not only trade between target and sender countries, 
but also with all trading partners of a target country. Later on, these findings have been 
verified by other scholars such as Yang et al. (2004) and Caruso (2003). 
Another important determinant of the country’s economic health that has been 
studied in connection with sanctions is foreign investment. Foreign investment is very 
powerful tool for economy growth, especially for the developing countries, as they have 
low liquidity, and foreign investments are crucial to implement their goals of development. 
Biglaiser & Lektzian (2011) studied effect of sanction on Foreign Direct Investment 
as the biggest source of foreign capital, using panel data for 171 countries from 1971 to 
2000. They found robust evidence that US sanctions significantly decrease US FDI into 
target nation due to the high risk and uncertainty. 
One more important economic variable is foreign exchange rate which 
unfortunately was not studied extensively enough. Foreign exchange rate of the domestic 
currency is one of the most crucial macroeconomic determinants that have an influence on 
current and future situation of a whole domestic economy’s development and particular 
economy’s agents. Foreign exchange rate movements have direct impact on the 
international trade, capital flows, volume of production and consumption, and other 
economic and social determinants. 
This indicator is more ambiguous than all mentioned above, because the 
depreciation of the currency has not only negative consequences, and also the appreciation 
has not only positive effects. Increase of a relative currency value makes export less 
profitable and more expensive for the international markets, while import turn to be less 
expensive, therefore more attractive. On the other hand, decrease of a currency value 




relative to other currencies makes its export more valuable and potentially makes it cheaper 
for the international markets, while import becomes less attractive due to its price growth. 
In spite of the fact that cheap currency relative to main trading partners can be 
economically profitable, quick exchange rate movements may lead to its high volatility 
which according to Arize et al. (2000) would have significant negative effect on the export 
flows. 
The study from Piana (2001) suggests that devaluation of the domestic currency 
increases the country burden of an international debt and provokes large outflows of 
interest payments, which can lead to recession effect. 
In general, sanctions should harm targeted economy by decreasing foreign 
investments and trade, increasing an uncertainty of the country’s political future, which will 
cause domestic currency depreciation (Sobel, 1998). 
  




3. Exchange Rate and Sanctions 
Since Bretton Woods system collapsed and floating exchange rate system was 
generalized, variety of models were invented trying to explain exchange rate dynamic, as 
well as predict its short- and long-term movements. 
The most prominent study on structural exchange rate models was made by Meese 
and Rogoff (1983). They matched most popular structural models of 1970s against random 
walk model on the basis of their out-of-sample forecasting accuracy. The analyzed models 
are: the flexible price monetary (Frenkel-Bilson) model, the sticky-price monetary 
(Dornbusch-Frankel) model, and the sticky-price asset (Hooper-Morton) model. 
Respectively, first model includes money supply, industrial production index and interest 
rate. Second model consist all of the mentioned variables plus inflation rate. The third 
model includes all of the mentioned variables plus trade balance. 
By testing these three models, Meese and Rogoff found that none of these models 
can outperform a random walk model at one- to twelve-month horizon for the dollar/pound, 
dollar/mark, dollar/yen and the trade-weighted dollar exchange rate. Moreover, after a 
number of attempts to argue this statement, evidence to disprove these results were not 
found (Rapach and Wohar, 2001; Mark and Sul, 2001).  
Nevertheless, Engel et al. (2007) claim that the test based on whether model beats 
random walk, is too strong criteria for the model evaluation, because under general 
conditions exchange rate movement simulate random walk.  
Evans and Lyons (1999) test microstructure model for exchange rate that includes 
order flow and interest rate. The model explains more than 50% of JPY/USD and DM/USD 
exchange rate changes in 4 months. Wright et al. (2007) test hybrid models that combine 




macroeconomic fundamentals and microstructure variables to explain US/Jamaica 
exchange rate’s movement. The study applies several models and eventually suggests that 
including micro-based variables improves explanation power for all the models. The paper 
finds four statistically significant variables with correct a priori sign for all the models. 
These variables are relative money, relative prices, USD purchases and interventions. 
Smith (2014) wrote the first paper that seeks to analyze effect of sanction on the 
foreign exchange rate using data of 40 countries that were sanctioned by US for some 
period between 1976 and 2000. The study considers several models, from which the most 
robust one includes gross domestic product, trade balance, foreign reserves, inflation rate 
and a dummy for the type of sanctions imposed. Eventually, the model suggests that 
comprehensive and financial sanctions have a negative impact on the year changes in 
nominal exchange rate. 
Another recent paper that is trying to explain the foreign exchange rate was written 
by Dreger et al. (2015) studies the case of Russia. The paper is using daily frequency data 
of the period from January 2014 to March 2015. The model used in this study includes 
nominal exchange rate, oil price, interest rates for overnight loans, sanction indices and 
media indices. Sanction index is the composite indicator of sanctions on and from Russia, 
which is determined from the cumulative sum of sanction dummies. Media index denotes 
of how frequently international media mentions topic related to Russia’s sanctions. The 
results of the model conclude that major portion of the Ruble depreciation was caused by 
the fall of oil prices, while sanctions have minor positive effect, significant only at the 
margin. 
 




Given the lack of a widely accepted model for nominal exchange rate, especially 
with sanctions effect accounted, neither of invented models is likely to be universally 
applicable. Therefore, the most reasonable approach is to empirically test various models 
and variables for each particular case. 
  




4. Case Study Sanctions on Russia 
Due to the conflict in Ukraine started in 2014, United States, European Union and 
some other countries imposed various sanctions on Russia. The first two rounds of 
sanctions were travel bans, freezing of assets located in sender countries imposed upon 
certain individuals and officials from Russia. It did not have significant effect, neither on 
Russia’s policy nor on economy, but definitely caused state of uncertainty, thus making it 
more vulnerable for the external shocks. 
The most crucial package of sanctions was implemented in July 2014, which 
imposed restrictions against certain sectors of Russia’s economy. It included restrictions in 
financial sector, ban on export of military, mining technologies and some engineering 
equipment. 
Moreover, at the III quarter of 2014 oil price has fallen by 50%, which turns to be a 
big loss for the Russia’s economy. According to the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, crude oil and petroleum products export accounted for 54% of Russia’s 
total export in 2013. Hence, the assessment of the sanctions’ effect is complicated by the 
fact that there are two external shocks happened in the short period of time, thus increasing 
harmful impact of each other. 
As a result, sanctions and the fall of oil price caused huge outflow of the capital, 
which led to boost of the volatility on exchange market, depreciation of the Russian 
currency by more than 50%, and increase of inflation.  
The literature of sanctions mentions several conditions that significantly increase 
likelihood of sanctions to be successful. One of the main conditions of successful sanctions 
is for them to be imposed by the major economic partners (McLean and Whang, 2010). For 




instance, sanctions from U.S. on Russia are apparently not as impactful as sanctions from 
Europe, given that some of Europe countries are one of the main partners of Russia.  
According to the Federal State Statistics Service the major trade partners of Russia 
at 2013 were EU countries (27.6% of whole import and 54.7% of whole export), when U.S. 
had only 2.3% of export and 3.4% of import. Chart 1 displays import and export with 
particular countries in % to whole import and export (based on data from 2014). 
Chart 1 – Main trading partners of Russia, % 
 
Source: European Commission Directorate-General Trade’s Statistics 
It is important to note that some of the banned U.S. products such as mining 
technologies and engineering equipment are unique and licensed, which makes them not 
replaceable. And even though, there are no visible consequences for Russia at this point of 
time, it may slow down development of new oil and gas fields. 
Another condition is that economy of a sender country should be significantly 
bigger than economy of a target country, otherwise sanctions will not be successful and 
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According to the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook from April 
2015, Russia holds only 3.1% of the world GDP based on PPP Valuation, whereas U.S. 
holds 16.1% and Europe 16.9%. Hence it follows that the economy of Russia significantly 
smaller than economy of U.S. or Europe, which increase likelihood of the sanctions to be 
successful. 
Another measure of partnership importance is the size of its investments. Based on 
the Federal State Statistics Service major international investments come from European 
Union members. More precisely, in 2013, 46% of import to Russia was from EU countries, 
and more than 50% of its export Russia transferred to EU countries. In the meantime, 
investments from U.S. accounted for only 5.1%. Table 2 represents inflows of the foreign 
investments in Russia at 2012 and 2013. 
Table 2 – Inflows of the foreign investments in Russia at 2012 and 2013 
 2012 2013 
 USD Million % of total USD Million % of total 
Foreign 
investments - total 
154570 100 170180 100 
By countries: 
Switzerland 46790 30.3 24602 14.4 
Cyprus 16455 10.6 22683 13.3 
UK 13490 8.7 18862 11.1 
Luxemburg 11523 7.5 16996 10.0 
Netherlands 21126 13.7 14779 8.7 
France 4193 2.7 10309 6.1 
Germany 7202 4.7 9157 5.4 
US 3384 2.2 8656 5.1 
Source: Federal State Statistics Service 




Although US investments are quite small, some sectors of Russia’s economy 
significantly rely on U.S. investments such as production of oil products (12% of all 
foreign investments in the production of oil products) and production of machines and 
equipment (28.1%). Furthermore, several US companies are substantial players in Russia. 
For instance, PepsiCo is the largest producer in Russian beverage and food market. Other 
examples represent Ford Motor Co., General Electric, Visa and Master Card (Congressional 
Research Service). 
Paper from Hufbauer et al. (2009) finds level of a target country democracy to be 
significant among other explanatory variables. The study finds that the higher the 
democracy level, the higher probability of sanctions to achieve stated goals. In accordance 
to Polity IV data, Russian Federation has moderately high and stable level of democracy. 
The index of Russia is 5 for the scale of indexes from -10 to +10. On the other side, The 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2015 denotes the Russia’s index as 3.31 
for the range from 0 to 10, which puts Russia on 132nd place among 165 countries and 
defines its regime as authoritarian. 
Since this study focuses on exchange rate, it is relevant to briefly consider current 
exchange rate regime of Russia. In 2005, the Bank of Russia implemented a dual-currency 
basket as main indicator for exchange rate. Then, in 2009 the mechanism of automatic 
correction of the allowed boundaries was introduced, according to the amount of 
intervention. In 2013, the Bank of Russia started to switch the main tool of managing 
exchange rate from interventions to interest rate. In November 2014, the interval of allowed 
values of dual-currency basket was finally abolished, as well as necessity for intervention in 
case of reaching these values. However, The Bank of Russia left the right to intervene in 




case of the risk to financial stability. Hence, when the Ruble started to fall in 2014, 
significant interventions were made in order to prevent this drop or at least stabilize the 
currency. According to the statistics in 2013 the Central bank sold only $24.26 in the 
foreign exchange market, but in 2014 CB sold $76.13 billion, from which $11.9 billion 
during December (CBR Statistics). 
  




5. Methodology and data 
The paper investigates the effect of sanction on exchange rate, moreover it seeks to 
go further and test the assumption that sanction could interfere relation of exchange rate 
and oil price. Hence, the hypotheses that will be tested in this paper are as follows: 
H1: The imposition of sanctions on Russia has a negative effect on its domestic 
currency versus foreign currencies. 
H2: The imposition of sanctions on Russia makes its currency more vulnerable to 
external shocks, particularly to the sharp fall of oil price. 
Hypothesis 2 assumes that the relation between exchange rate and oil price may 
vary due to presence of sanctions, in other words, that sanctions make exchange rate of 
Russia more vulnerable to the fall of oil price. Hence, if the hypothesis is true, the relation 
between exchange rate and oil price with implemented sanctions is different from when 
there are no sanctions. Thus, the study seeks to find weather sanctions made Russia more 
vulnerable to external shocks or not. The hypothesis based on the fact that both events 
occurred simultaneously, hence it would be misleading not to take into account possible 
interference of these two events. 
As it is discussed above, there is no widely accepted model for exchange rate. 
Thereby, empirical studies use various sets of variables to analyze exchange rate according 
to particular characteristics of country. By following this approach, particular structural 
model was constructed and adjusted to the economy of Russia. There is a wide range of 
economic indicators which have an impact on domestic currency. Thus, the number of main 




economic indicators was tested for the relevance, statistically significant impact and 
multicollinearity among them. Eventually, the variables chosen for the final model are 
money supply, oil price, government interventions, interest rate and sanctions.  Apparently, 
it is possible to include more variables which will increase the fit of the model, but then it 
would decrease the degrees of freedom and statistical power of the regression.  
The chosen model specification is denoted as follows: 
exrt= f (mt, intervt, oilt, it, dummy)  (1) 
Money supply (m). Money supply is used as the variable in the most of the models 
that seeks to explain exchange rate movements. According to the Flexible Price model 
(Frankel, 1976), an increase of money supply leads to depreciation of the national currency. 
Sticky Price model (Dornbusch, 1976), also known as Overshooting Model, suggests that 
an increase in a country’s money supply reduces domestic interest rate, and then the drop of 
interest rate leads to a short-run depreciation of the domestic currency, that is larger than 
the long run equilibrium. 
Interventions (interv). The purpose of interventions is to stop the drop, or at least to 
abate it. In case of Russia, interventions were also used as a tool to keep exchange rate 
between determined boundaries. 
There have been many controversial results from the impact of interventions on 
exchange rate. Nevertheless, Marcel Fratzscher (2005), based on the wide sample of the 
major currencies, finds robust evidences of the long-run effect of sterilized interventions on 
exchange rate. Moreover, Taylor and Sarno (2001) point out that interventions may have an 
impact on foreign exchange markets for a long period as such actions alert other market 
participants, thus altering their expectations and behavior.  




Oil price (oil). Variety of scholars has studied connection between exchange rates 
of commodity-exporting countries to the price of those commodities. Most of them indicate 
strong connection between exchange rate and commodities, which in most of the cases is 
oil. As reported by Habib and Kalamova (2007) and some other papers, Russian ruble is the 
“oil currency”, meaning that world oil price has a strong positive relation with ruble. 
According to Jouko Rautava (2004), oil price has a strong impact on GDP of 
Russia. Moreover, simple correlation and variance inflation tests were conducted to check 
for the presence of correlation between these two time series. The results indicate strong 
correlation, which means that they are highly collinear. Finally, GDP of Russia is presented 
only in quarterly frequency, when the rest of the data has monthly frequency. Everything 
mentioned above makes GDP inapplicable to use in this study, but fully replaceable by oil 
price variable. (Nearly perfect correlation between logarithm of the Brent oil prices and 
Russia’s GDP changes in percentage according to the previous period are presented in the 
attachments section – Figure 1). 
Interest rate (i). Raise of interest rate increases potential earnings from investments 
in domestic currency, its demand is increasing and thus the currency relative value is also 
growing. Central banks widely use interest rate as a tool to stop or relax currency 
depreciation. Interest rate is included in all structural and hybrid models. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Data set is taken from the Data Stream and Federal State Statistic Service. It has 
monthly frequency and covers the period from January 2009 to June 2015. The Figures of 
all variables are presented in Appendix. The exchange rate is defined as nominal bilateral 
exchange rate of the Ruble against the US Dollar, more accurately it is a price of US Dollar 




in terms of Ruble (Figure 2). For the money supply variable the M2 measure is used 
(Figure 3). Interventions are Russia Central Bank sales of USD (Figure 4). Interest rate is 
taken as Russian Interbank middle rate for 31 to 90 days (Figure 5). The oil price variable is 
the price of Brent oil in US Dollars per barrel (Figure 6). Sanctions are expressed through 
the dummy variable which is equal to 0 until August 2014, when the most substantial 
package of sanctions was imposed. The rest of the period dummy is equal to 1, indicating 
the presence of sanctions. All the variables are presented in logarithmic form, except the oil 
price and dummy variable.  
Exchange rate, money supply, interest rate and interventions are taken as 
endogenous variables, when oil price, dummy of sanctions and interaction of sanctions with 
oil price are taken as exogenous. 
Empirical Analysis 
The econometric software which is used for employing the tests and constructing the model 
is Eviews 8 program. 
First of all, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root test was conducted for all 
of the variables to check whether they are stationary or not, and if not, what are the orders 
of integration. All of the time series appear to be integrated of order one or I(1). 
  




Table 3. Unit root test. 
Time series Level 1st difference 
                     t-Statistics 
exr  1.25 -3.77* 
m -2.23 -4.83* 
interv -1.82 -8.74* 
i -2.9 -6.73* 
oil -1.83 -9.06* 
Note: The test performed by Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test. Null hypothesis of the test is 
presence of a unit root. * denotes rejection of null hypothesis at the 1% significance level. Lag lengths are 
indicated through Akaike information criterion. Test is performed with a constant. 
 The paper from Engle and Granger (1987) states, that the linear regression of non-
stationary variables may be stationary in case the variables are cointegrated. Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) with all endogenous variables is constructed in order to determine 
optimal lag length for the Vector Error Correction (VEC) model. On the basis of Schwarz 
information criterion two lags are identified as the optimal lag length. Then Johansen 
Cointegration test, proposed by Johansen (1988), was performed in order to check for the 
presence of long-term relationships among them. Oil price series and dummy are not 
included since they are assumed as exogenous variables. Test allows for intercept in 
cointegrating equation and VAR.  Both versions of the test (Trace and Maximum 
Eigenvalue) reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration and indicate presence of 1 
cointegrating equations at 5% significance level (Table 4). 
  




Table 4. Johansen Cointegration test. 

















* denotes rejection of null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% significance level. 
P-values are presented in parentheses. 
According to the Lütkepohl et al. (2005), if there are cointegrating relations among 
variables, the application of the VAR model will lead to the spurious regression problem. 
On the other hand, so-called Vector Error Correction model can be used for the 
cointegrating systems.  It is restricted version of the VAR model with error correction 
features. VEC model enables to describe long- and short-term relationships among 
nonstationary time series that are cointegrated in the same order and eliminates the problem 
of spurious regression which appears in case of Vector Autoregressive. Hence, Vector Error 
Correction model is applied in this study. VEC model estimates cointegration relationship 
using Johansen procedure, it also represents speed of adjustment of variables towards 
long-run equilibrium along with parameters of short-run effect. 
Simple form of the VEC model with two cointegrated variables and one lag length 
can be presented as follows: 
Δxt = λ2 (yt-1 – βxt-1– α) + λ1Δxt-1 + λ2Δyt-1 + εt         (2) 
Where et-1 = (yt-1 – βxt-1 – α) is so-called error correction term that indicates 
long-run relationship between yt and xt, λ1 and λ2 represent speed of adjustment in case 




of disequilibrium, in other words they indicate the response of y and x to deflections from 
long-run equilibrium, Δxt-1 and Δyt-1 are the parameters of short-run effect, εt is 
independent and identically-distributed error term. 
Since specified model has only one cointegrating equation it is also applicable to 
run Dynamic Least Squares (DOLS) and Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS) models. 
As stated in Lyhagen et al. (2007), this restriction occurs since those methods are residual 
based. FMOLS and DOLS models correct for endogeneity bias and serial correlation in 
cointegrated regression, thus allowing for the standard normal inference.  
FMOLS is applying semi-parametric autocorrelation correction using estimated 
residuals from cointegrating regressions and differenced explanatory variables. Thus, 
FMOLS method adjusts endogeneity and short-term dynamics of the errors (Philips and 
Hanson, 1990). 
DOLS approach was developed by Saikkonen (1992) and Stock and Watson (1993). 
It involves parametric correction for endogeneity by adding lagged values of the first 
difference.  
𝑥𝑡 =  𝜆0  +  𝜆1𝑍𝑡  +  ∑ 𝜆𝑗∆𝑍𝑡−1  + 
𝑝
𝑗=−𝑝 𝜂𝑡            (3) 
Where Zt is a vector of explanatory variables, p is number of lags and Δ is a lag 
operator. 
At this point, specified regression in VEC, DOLS and FMOLS representations can 
be constructed (Table 4). Those models require variables to be first difference stationary, 
therefore the variables are taken on the level. All models assume constant as the trend 
specification. 




 All of the methods indicate stationary long-run relations among exchange rate 
(exr), money supply (m), interest rate (i), interventions (interv), price of the oil (oil), 
dummy of sanctions (D) and interaction variable (oil*D) with high explanatory power of 
each variable and of the whole model. According to the t-statistics, all of the variables are 
significant at 1% level of significance. 
Table 5. VEC, DOLS and FMOLS models. 











































































The numbers in ( ) indicate standard errors. T-statistics are presented in [ ]. 
Test for the inverse roots of the characteristic AR polynomial suggests that the 
estimated VEC model is stable (or stationary). The stability condition of the test requires 




that the number of unit roots has to be equal to the number of endogenous variables minus 
the number of cointegrating relationships. At the same time the moduli of the remaining 
roots have to be less than unity. Autocorrelation LM test proposed by Johansen (1995) 
indicates rejection of serial correlation among residuals since all the p-values are higher 
than 0.05.  
  




6. Results and Conclusion 
The coefficients vary considerably between each model. However, VEC, DOLS and 
FMOLS approaches denote negative and statistically significant coefficients of the 
sanctions variable, which equal to 0.98, 2.31 and 2.12 respectively. Thus, all models 
confirm the presence of strong impact of sanctions on exchange rate in the long-run 
perspective.  
The second hypothesis is that sanctions have substantial influence on the connection 
between exchange rate and oil price. VEC, DOLS and FMOLS methods indicate negative 
and statistically significant coefficients of 0.2, 0.48 and 0.45 respectively. The results 
suggest that the sanctions increase the impact of the world oil price on exchange rate of the 
Russian currency. 
This paper makes its contribution into a quite unexplored, but very important field 
by testing the influence of exchange rate on the relative value of Russia’s domestic 
currency and its interference to the relation between the currency and price of the oil. The 
study applies exchange rate model based on the literature analysis, but also adjusts it to the 
particular case of Russia’s economy. The model is stable and has substantially high 
explanatory power of the exchange rate movements. 
The findings suggest that sanctions are indeed play significant role in exchange rate 
value, thus the imposition of sanctions has strong negative effect on the currency’s value. 
Moreover, the model finds that sanctions make Ruble more dependent on the oil price. 
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Figure 1 – Russia GDP change in percentage according to the previous period and 
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